Tuesday, March 15, 2016

Making a Deal with the Patriarchal Devil: Cybernetic Feminism on the Global Stage

Richards’ analysis of cyborg identities on the global political stage helped illustrate just how broadly we can construe the cyborg ontology. Even though the theory was precipitated by the 20th Century proliferation of computers, Haraway points to how humanity has blended with our technologies—something that began when we first developed writing systems. But Richards isn’t directly concerned with technology as much as she’s concerned with how our political systems
have been a) instantiated by technology, b) imbued with power dynamics, and c) privileged male power. Thus, American presidential politics represents patriarchal technology as it has shunned the body and vaunted a cult of masculinity; subsequently, when women enter into this realm, they must become cybernetic, adopting the cultural scripts of technological patriarchal politics, fulfilling the trope of the “iron lady,” a term that simultaneously evokes the machines of war and a feminized body. However, where this gets complicated is the fact that this isn’t a zero-sum game—a female politician isn’t required to evoke this trope, as much as she has the autonomy to exercise this trope at will depending upon the rhetorical situation. This, of course, can have positive and negative consequences—female leaders are required to maintain fractured identities and held to a mythical male standard of a unified, solitary identity. But ultimately, Richards is hopeful that the use of cyborg identity by female bodies can be liberating and empowering. In a sense, the cyborg identity allows cybernetic individuals more liberty to act both within and against the system—seeing how the incorporation of the dominant discourse can ultimately be beneficial for the cause of feminism. Put succinctly, the cyborg feminist must make a deal with the patriarchal devil in order to defeat him.


We see this deployment of cybernetic feminism in Kuehl’s article on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The UDHR is a document that was approved by the United Nations and a division of the UN is devoted to investigating human rights violations—meaning that a lot of the discourse on human rights has been instantiated by masculinist political technologies, and as such has mitigated the importance of bodies and the social rights of individuals, critiques of the document that Kuehl mentions. But, Keuhl’s overarching goal is to show how the document might actually be working within a feminist paradigm. For one, Eleanor Roosevelt—an iron lady in her own right—was influential in the creation of the document. But what Keuhl ultimately focuses on is how the social rights of individuals are framed in the metaphors of procreation and family—metaphors that seems much more focused on the biological, despite being housed in a “technological” context. We see this cybernetic juxtaposition in the second stanza of the UDHC that contrasts the “barbarous acts” of the early twentieth century (conducted via masculine political technologies) with the overarching goal of “the advent of a world” that abhors such atrocity (172). This advent of the world represents the feminist liberatory goal of the UDHC that is couched in a biological metaphor in stark juxtaposition to masculine atrocity. Keuhl also points to the subordinate metaphor of the “Human Family” as another biological metaphor that is operating within this international logic, re-framing the nations of the world as engaged in more than just civic relationships. Keuhl reminds us “People do not belong to a family because of rational thought, but instead, because of ethnic ties, [or] blood relations…”; bringing in the idea of family pushes us beyond the cold mechanisms of politics and gets us to biology. In that way, we are seeing how both technological and biological discousres are at play on the global stage, illustrating the cybernetic frame put forth by Richards in her analysis of the Iron Lady trope.

Not JUST a Woman: a Cyborg

            In her article, I believe Richards posits that women who have successfully achieved political power today have done so by, in some way, emphasizing their ability to be more than "just a woman" - rather, these women in political power have proven that, in some ways, they can use technology to somehow liberate themselves from their female bodies and maintain qualities which are, today, thought of as more "masculine." (Richards 4).

            What, though, is the reconfiguration of feminism that Richards posits? Keya Maitra, I believe, informs us of this answer by noting Sandra Bartky's development of feminist consciousness. Feminist consciousness is a woman's understand that "the entire structure of socioeconomic and cultural systems ... work[s] toward women's oppression." Thus, feminist consciousness is a "consciousness of victimization" that seeks the "possibilities of change, transformation, and eventually liberation." (Maitra 367).

            Maitra attempts to reconfigure the feminist consciousness by advocating for a change in the way we view the oppression of women: rather than viewing women's oppression as a group, Maitra claims that we should be open to understanding the cultural differences that lead to each individual woman's oppression. (Maitra 368).

            Richards offers another tactic. Rather than reconfiguring the feminist consciousness by more thoroughly understanding individualized oppression, or even on the oppression of women itself, Richards offers a new focus: women's abilities, through technology, to act as a "cyborg": that is, to overcome the limitations of our female bodies when necessary to promote a facade of strength. (Richards 10). For example, Richards notes the chant in Liberia of "Ellen--she's our man," and extrapolates that "this woman president cannot be just a woman, but must transcend biologically determined sex and culturally constructed gender to become a cyborg that can shape and shift gender for the given rhetorical situation."

            Richards notes numerous times that Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan did an excellent job expressing the "cyborg" personality by planning a C-section after her due date to minimize the times she was "incapacitated" in the political opposition's eyes. (Richards 13).

            Richards posits that, in order to achieve politically, women must embody this "cyborg" mentality and gender-shift when necessary to show both traditional feminine emotion and empathy and traditional masculine strength and power. One explicit example of this is Richards' analysis of why Segolene Royal of France lost to Nicolas Sarkozy in the fall election; Royal "appears to perform a rejection/ignorance of the iron lady that has traditionally broken the glass ceilings of other countries." (Richards 12). Because Royal failed to show her ability to be a "cyborg" and display a "manlier" side evoking power, Richards believes she did not win in the election: "Much of the criticism around Royal after her defeat centered on how France could have accepted an iron lady into the 'old boy's club' of French presidents, but not a sexually attractive mother or a Socialist in Stilettos." (Richards 13).

            Thus, I believe that, by focusing on how women can overcome oppression, as opposed to focusing on how women become aware of their oppression, as did Maitra, Richards offers a new reconfiguration of feminism.




Getting beyond the "Iron Lady" Trope

I asked each of you to find a reconfiguration in today’s readings, and in that spirit, I’ll try to enact one of my own. It's a bit claim-driven and argumentative, but that's because I’m at the humble and awkward beginning stages of a book project that conjoins rhetoric, irony, and transnational feminism. In that book project, I absolutely echo the efforts of scholars like Richards, Maitra and Kuehl (and Tripp, and Shome, and Hegde ...) by recognizing that, if we do not situate transnational studies at the intersection of conscious awareness and subconscious circulation, then we may continue to promote notions of rhetorical agency or historical identity that are incompatible with the systems in which women need to increase their political standing.

As a result, I'm interested in any global rhetorical methodology or critical practice that raises our awareness of how women “formulate choices” (Maitra, 2013, p. 361). Formulating choices, in turn, needs “to be articulated through a level of feminist self-consciousness that provides the location of feminist consciousness” (p. 361). I find that critical irony helps point to this "location" and helps promote this self-consciousness more effectively than other global mindsets. This is because those other mindsets often assume that third-world feminists have an inadequate self-consciousness or that third-world women are automatically robbed of their historical and political agency.

What stands out to me concretely from today’s set of readings is the importance of replacing (or finding alternatives to) these mindsets so as to overcome what Maitra calls a “monolithic view of [rhetorical] agency” where oppressed “sisters” are given objectified status (2013, p. 366), and to overcome models for representation that are single-dimensional, unidirectional discursive phenomenon “located purely in the Western feminist experience, subjectivity, and consciousness” (p. 366). I see value in turning our attention to the space between what we observe or remember about women’s political identifications and the ways in which we historicize those observations and remembrances. In other words, I’m quite interested in noticing how certain discourses are used to establish hierarchies, when we are the ones using them. Irony – when we understand it as a "discursive event" – makes these hierarchies more visible.

As Kendall Phillips and Mitchell Reyes write in their project on Global Memoryscapes, “[r]hetorical claims are grounded in our collective remembrance of a shared past in such a way that each claim both recalls and reformulates that past” (2011, p. 1). One particular rhetorical claim that I find myself working against – one obvious trope that reflects remembrances of a shared past – is that of the “iron lady,” and this is why it keeps resurfacing in my work. 

We have seen Richards argues quite well that the “iron lady” nickname provides an accurate and complicated instantiation of Donna Haraway’s cyborg ontology in the writings of women leaders on the world stage (2011, p. 2), and I agree that it provides insight from a western framework into how women figures have emerged into roles of leadership as a result of global saturation. I do like her use of the “double bind” metaphor.

Yet it is this very same notion of the iron lady trope as a “double bind” that causes me to want to disrupt the trope as a tool for historicization, and particularly for historicization of pan-African women, a cultural/regional group I have been studying as of late.

I especially think “iron lady” can reveal some of the weaknesses and inadequacies of how feminist critics in the West do rhetorical analysis on African women’s texts for three reasons: (1) First, the trope colonizes by assuming a normative label that was first given to figures who inherited a familial political standing or who led states that were rich in cultural privilege (D. Leonard, 2005); (2) Second, the trope directs attention to women’s performances according to how well they overcome the outsider status to demonstrate themselves as insiders, or how they resolve the tension between belonging and not belonging, when this may not be their principal strategy or goal; and (3) Third, the trope might organize women’s diplomatic performances by linking them to certain ideas of statehood, citizenship, or decolonization (R. Shome, 1996) that may be too narrow or inadequate to account for the fraught contexts in which they work.

These limitations, in turn, undermine historians’ efforts to contend with how women can lead effectively in contexts where political allegiances are complex and familial inheritances unclear. For example, how can stateless women lead? How can women lead when there is no concrete nation, or when a nation’s borders are being contested? How would we valuate the rhetorical performances of women leaders who are discursively marked?

More importantly, I think these limitations undermine historians’ efforts to understand how new rhetorical models can emerge out of new ways of remembering when women leaders participate in networked contexts, where Kock and Villadsen say “diverse cultures increasingly seek access and acceptance in [each other’s] modern democracies” (2012).

If we have observed anything this semester, it is that the writing of rhetorical histories is multivocal and transideological. In my own work, then, because they have historically occupied liminal spaces, African women’s performances might require a critical lens that emerges more from alterity, transience, political asylum, and diaspora, and less from nationalist tendencies (Shome and Hegde, 2010; A. Tripp, 2003).

In sum, I’m working on getting “beyond” this iron lady trope, in spite of its usefulness as a rhetorical tool. And that is my reconfiguration for this evening.

I absolutely welcome questions, feedback, puzzlement, skepticism, and etc. This is all a work in progress,
-Dr. Graban 


Discussion on 3/1 and 3/15: Reconfiguring Feminist Paradigms

Dear All,

As my contribution for the day, I have promised a bridge between last class and today's set of readings, centered on the question of "What is being reconfigured"? Here are some various pathways to answering that question.


(1) Reminding ourselves of what we understand to be major trends in "feminist rhetorical theory" or "feminist rhetorical criticism" or "feminist rhetorical work," in order to better situate Hesford/Schell's, Jarratt's, Dingo's, Richards's, Kuehl's, and Maitra's projects as transformative, resistant, or deviant. 

This worksheet -- an artifact I was planning to bring to class -- provides some basic overview of "western feminist rhetorical theory" in the contemporary world, if only to give us a sense of major theoretical breakthroughs in feminist studies in rhet/comp. 

You'll see at the end of the worksheet that I have offered up one example of a "reconfiguration" of feminist rhetorical paradigms by Keith Lloyd, specifically for doing work in comparative and inter-cultural rhetorics. 

If we wanted to, we could easily populate the rest of the worksheet by looking back at our historical case studies this semester, and determining which of them offered feminist aims or outcomes.


(2) Observing collaborative and cross-disciplinary projects as they try to define "transnational rhetorical feminism."

For example, this site (now inactive) served as a timely discussion space for TNRF methodologies, circa 2010.


(3) Building intertextual conversations about methodology (such as we did on 3/1).

To that end, I can offer up pithy highlights from our last class discussion.

Jarratt (1998, 2004), "Beside Ourselves": What are the implications for us and the field? What’s in it for us? Women’s political performances in transnational contexts more broadly require an analytic theory that can accommodate alterity, account for transient discursive aspects of democracy in multicultural societies, and enable different cultural attitudes toward citizenship, social philosophy, and privilege. The problem is who speaks on behalf of whom? Who is listening? And how does this help us to understand how the "other" speaks?
“What strikes me as most apt in the specifically postcolonial rhetoric of these two feminists is the tension here between metonymic and metaphoric representation--between a poststructural dispersal of subjectivity and an ethical commitment to analyzing communication in terms of the material realities of speakers and listeners” (Jarratt, 2004, p. 121).


Hesford & Schell (2008), "Configurations of Transnationality": What's missing from the way we take up the field? Political economies. Merely folding Anzaldua into the canon is insufficient, because that might romanticize mobility and hybridity. Tokenizing writers gets in the way of performing a truly geopolitical analysis.
“Our goal is not to monumentalize transnational feminist critics or to position rhetorical studies as a passive recipient of transnational studies or vice-versa, but to establish a much-needed reciprocity among these fields and to encourage scholars to engage in an examination of transnational texts and publics and to question normative understandings of nation, nationalism, and citizenship” (Hesford & Schell, 2008, p. 466). 

Dingo (2008), "Linking Transnational Logics": How/why can we bring network models to transnational work? Transnational rhetorical links in public policy are created by neoliberal economics, neoliberal power relationships and permeable borders (2008, p. 493). A feminist analysis of the material effects of transnationalism (where material = policy) provides us a better metaphor for tracing and valuing this work.
“As my interrogation of World Bank and U.S. welfare policy shows, transnational situations that may seem radically different and disconnected are actually bound by transnational networks of power, neoliberal logics, and similar rhetorical practices that function to define and contain women’s agency in the global marketplace” (Dingo, 2008, pp. 502-3).

(4) Constructing original arguments about what What Keya Maitra calls a more “mindful response” to Mohanty’s notion of “Feminism without borders” (2013, p. 360): an ethic or ideology that moves us closer to a kind of rhetorical diplomacy. 

Several of us are working on these arguments this evening in our blog posts, for 3/15.


(5) Beginning to articulate our own "transnational rhetorical feminist" (TNRF) methodology by meshing together the concerns we have been observing at the intersections of identity, intercultural study, globalism, feminism, and rhet/comp.

Based on a quick scan of my class notes over the semester, I have thrown together this list, but I have no doubt we could revise it together:
  • enables the study of communications outside of an Aristotelian framework (helps us to rethink framework)
  • promotes a kind of self-reflexivity of our own reactions to texts (that are, themselves, tied to triggers, stereotypes, and prejudices) and also to their patterns of circulation 
  • promotes linkages between local cultures and global problems
  • involves learning how to question “development” and “globalization” as a text, an ideology, a movement
  • pays attention to how “trans” means “changing the nature of something” and not just “moving through, across, or between”
  • recognizes how globalization is uneven by looking at the multiple powers at work in/on a single location (commercial, ethnic, cultural, corporate, etc.)
  • sees social and economic issues as intertwined and builds a critical vocabulary based on those things
  • tries to avoid cultural hegemonic interpretation (where “hegemony” means one view is seen as naturally dominant over another)
  • considers borders as discourses (i.e., ethnic borders, ideological borders), and assumes that borders change
  • encourages us to understand “nation” as a discursive construct, and perhaps help us to know what values or ideals we are currently using to define and understand “nation.”
  • involves reading the decolonization of a culture through its colonizing rhetorics
  • asks how the local/vernacular can help promote models for transnational rhet/comp that might work from the ground up, where “verna” = relationship between the local and the institutional

In doing so, we might consider the list of key terms that we generated early this semester.

That's my offering for the week,
-Dr. Graban

Friday, February 26, 2016

Do Not Use Indigeneity as a Tool of Separation, and Try Not to Inadvertently Misrepresent Liberia

A Relationship of the Minds

Leymah Gbowee’s Nobel lecture presented an opportunity to look into the world from a Liberian standpoint. The more we dive into the discourse of different cultures, the more I see this disconnect that occurs between “outsiders” and the cultures they are looking into. The concept of indigeneity is so broad. It implies that a culture is felt the same way by all people within that culture. But culture can be expressed in many different ways. For instance, when looking up key terms within the text of Gbowee’s speech, it was obvious the Internet was filled with so many sources attempting to convey a message behind every term that it was hard to choose hyperlinks to link to each term.

If I wanted to talk about Liberia as a country, I could go to the official Liberian government’s site to gain information [ http://www.emansion.gov.lr/ ] or the Liberia Wikipedia page [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberia ] or a seemingly endless number of links that showed up from a simple Google search. The thing I could not do was be a citizen of Liberia from birth, because I already exist as a U.S. citizen by birth. So, this complicated things tremendously. But it cannot stop there, because all those links from Google came from different places, they could not possibly be 100% connected to each other. They are separate. To take it one step further, I rely on a hypothetical.

Say, in a perfect world, every link about Liberia had to come from a Liberian writer or else it would never be accepted as a credible source about Liberia, and Google would not allow any links from “outside” writers to surface on the Internet. In such a world, would every writer have the same experiences as all the other writers? Absolutely not. It is impossible, even in that “perfect” world, because there is one thing that keeps every human from completely understanding every other human: a disconnection of the minds.

What then is this indigeneity? Does it actually exist? No and yes. It does not exist in its implication of “sameness” throughout the peoples of one culture or place. But indigeneity does exist if it is considered a relationship between several people of one culture or place.

Indigeneity and Liberia

So, I argue that indigeneity is a product of relationships between people in a culture or place. If you move those people to a different place—together—they still form a community of ideals. If you take over their lands, they still have each other. I do not want to focus on how colonization uses the concept of indigeneity to create “others” out of the colonized, but rather focus on how indigeneity can be used by people of a certain culture or place to build a community that supports each other. That form of indigeneity is positive, because it comes from the communities that have made themselves a community based of the place they have lived in or formed their culture in. The other form is created by the “outsiders”—the ones that use indigeneity as a tool of separation, furthering the disconnection of the minds.

In Chapter 7 of Rhetorics of the Americas (Baca & Villanueva), “Rhetoric and Resistence in Hawai’i: How Silenced Voices Speak Out in Colonial Contexts”, Georganne Nordstrom wrote:

Since history is most often written by the victor, the experiences of indigenous peoples and other marginalized ethnic groups in colonized locations are frequently portrayed in such a way so as to cast the colonizer in a specific favorable light and downplay oppressive practices. (Nordstrom 117)

Nordstrom’s words show us how indigeneity can be used by colonizers to manipulate a culture by leaving facts out or creating descriptions of indigenous peoples that do not stand in truth. How this relates to Exploratory 3 is how Ashley, Stephanie, and I chose our sources to link to different terms in Leymah Gbowee’s Nobel Prize speech. Being “outsiders”, we were determining which sources to use to build the context of the speech, and even though we were trying our best to find sources to create the context of the speech, that was the problem: We were creating the context, and we were leaving some things out and choosing what we thought was important in terms of context. Even though our goal was not to marginalize any sources nor to misrepresent the Liberian culture, it was inevitable; we could not help it, because there are too many factors going into what should be used as a source or not be used as a source, and because we are not even a part of the Liberian culture, we are not responsible for representing that culture.

All we could do is try to understand the context of the speech by looking at sources on our own, which is fine. But once we decided to pick certain sources for terms, we were inadvertently attempting to represent the culture based on our own perceptions and understandings. I even added some songs to coincide with certain abstract ideals in the speech (i.e. “’…peace, social justice and equality.’ [“Wonderful Everyday”] [Lyrics] [Original]”), which was an attempt by me to help guide any readers towards showing empathy for the struggles of the Liberian women (and other people) Gbowee mentions in her speech, but the songs were not really directly related to the speech. So, I was creating something that was coming from my own perception of their struggles. The song at the end of our contextualization (“[ ( : VIDEO : ) ]”), however, is a more proper representation of the struggles of West African women (and other West African people), but only in its own context. In the context of our contextualization, the song became what we thought properly represented the West Africans’ struggles.

Insights


When reading anything, especially something written from the perspective of someone from a culture outside of your own, it is important to remember you cannot fully represent another person’s thoughts or culture based on your own research, but you can try to take in your own understanding of their text/discourse/rhetoric to bring it some importance to your own life, which is a positive way to listen to a culture instead of speaking for it. Having said that, I believe our Exploratory’s contextualization can be useful as we remember it is only one way to look at the culture of Liberia through Gbowee’s speech. The speech itself is another way to see her struggles and the struggles of West African women and women (and other people) of other countries she mentioned in her speech. But the possibilities for representation are endless, and no single representation should be used as a model of what Liberian culture (or any other culture) is or is not.

Subject Position(s): Rejecting Rhetorical Manipulation and Delimited Situation

In the title track to their “coming-of-age” album Futures, Jim Adkins of popular American alternative rock band Jimmy Eat World repeats, “Hey now, the past is told by those who win.” To the victor go the spoils, and apparently a large portion of those spoils include the ability to write off the histories of the oppression of other ethnic groups and cultures as subsidiary and inconsequential. They simply do not fit the tale of progress that Western civilizations have worked so hard to write. However, Georganne Nordstrom describes the creation of this reductive narrative as a form of rhetorical manipulation that seeks to elide difference and dissidence to position colonization as a form of salvation from a lack of civilization. “Such rhetorical manipulation of the historical record in mainstream Western discourse,” Nordstrom writes, “has resulted in the production of a specific picture of Native Hawaiians and the immigrant laborers brought in to work the plantations as passive, content, and welcoming of the civilizing agenda of the benevolent colonizers” (117). The rhetorical manipulation imposed by the “victors,” then, downplays the counter-narrative of struggle that underscores most perpetuated stories of progress.

When Meghan and I went about constructing our visualized discourse analysis of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf’s Nobel Prize acceptance speech, we found it relatively easy to deconstruct the speech based upon the heuristic presented on the blog (Transtextual, Contextual, Intratextual), but we could not so easily discern indigeneity emerging from this analytical paradigm. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the word “indigenous” originated in the mid-17th century and comes from the Latin “indigena,” which translates to “a native.” Thus, for us, indigeneity came to naturally entail struggle, diaspora, and oppression as natives across the globe have been historically marginalized in their own lands, languages, and cultural practices.

In Sirleaf’s speech, we noticed moments when Sirleaf would directly address or position herself as speaking on behalf of her fellow Liberians; however, this practice did not necessarily alert us to presences or absences of indigeneity, largely due in part to the nature of the speech itself. As discussed in class this week, the Nobel Prize—even the acceptance speech itself—seemed to function as an ideology product, making the speech and the whole event seem staged, scripted and performative, a disingenuous narrative part of the larger disingenuous whole narrative of peace and progress.

However, like all progress narratives, there was an underlying tale of struggle—of displacement, of subversion—that we were able to bring back to the surface when we applied a different lens through which to analyze Sirleaf’s discourse. This lens, one of subject position as defined by Jacqueline Jones Royster in “When the First Voice You Hear is Not Your Own,” allowed us to notice Sirleaf’s indigeneity in her refusal to stay still, to occupy one position on the stage and to address one audience. “Using subject position as a terministic screen in cross-boundary discourse,” according to Royster, “permits analysis to operate kaleidoscopically, thereby permitting interpretation to be richly informed by the converging of dialectical perspectives” (29).

Using subject position as our analytical framework for “mining” for moments of indigeneity as they appeared in Sirleaf’s speech, then, we were able to notice subtle disruptions to the narrative of progress that ideology products attempt to impose upon international instances of war and peace and, consequently, indigeneity. For example, Sirleaf pushes back against the traditional meanings associated with the Nobel Peace Prize and the Nobel Laureate, positioning herself and the award as a symbolic reflection of peace, but not in the way that one might wish for her to. She does not simply reflect peace. She reflects the struggle for peace.

The award, then, has not been given to Sirleaf, but to all of Liberia, Yemen, Africa, and anyone across the globe who is struggling for peace. The award, which usually symbolizes what has been accomplished and—particularly—what has been accomplished by one individual, as a result of Sirleaf’s subversive subject position, symbolizes what still needs accomplishing. Sirleaf and her fellow recipients are not static characters in the plot of a Western narrative of progress. The story is not finished; Sirleaf’s story is not finished. Peace has not yet come to Liberia, to Yemen, or to Africa, and no award can make that happen.

Furthermore, the two other positions that Sirleaf occupies on the very restricting stage of the Nobel Prize lecture subtly subvert the nature of the event itself, as she invokes the past recipients of the award as a lineage to herself as a recipient and enacts a form of Burkean identification with women across the world who are struggling for peace. In both positions, Sirleaf claims for herself a different history, a different narrative. She writes a history that does not delimit conflicts and progress, but instead extends the stationary staged event beyond its physical location.

Moreover, it is not just Sirleaf’s inability to stay still that evokes her indigeneity, but it is also her inability to be delimited or situated, by the constraints of the event and the ideology product of the Prize itself. Maps do not offer accurate representations of Earth’s lands not only because they cannot achieve perfectly correct proportions, but also because they draw such neat lines of demarcation between locations. Western progress narratives have painted indigenous peoples as accepting of these enforced boundaries, but, again, these narratives elide competing narratives of subversion and contestation that are much more emblematic of indigeneity. As Sirleaf occupies her three main positions, then, she changes her language—the audience she addresses and her use of figurative language.

Furthermore, as Meghan and Mikaela have pointed out, Sirleaf also plays a lot with the chronology of her speech, referring to past, present, and future in “non-Western” ways. To that point, in many Postcolonial works of literature, narratives are often told “a-chronologically,” with less attention to the placing of events and more attention to the events themselves, sometimes the repetition of these events to give them more emphasis and to force readers to keep re-seeing them in new lights.

Sirleaf addresses her past, Liberia’s past, and the history of the Nobel Peace Prize, but she does not do so to focus on what has been accomplished. She does so, instead, to argue for what we might call continuous improvement—in Liberia, Yemen, all of Africa, and everywhere. In doing so, she rejects the narrative of progress that ideology products attempt to impose on indigenous cultures, narratives which say, “You’ve made it! Now, we’re going to ‘save’ another country!” Sirleaf rejects the Nobel Prize’s final period, replacing it with a comma, a breath that sets up a continuation to the narrative.

Now, this might not be what Sirleaf intended at all. Our lens of subject position may not have provided the correct framework to analyze Sirleaf’s discourse. However, I think Royster’s “kaleidoscopic” framework allowed us to “visualize” Sirleaf’s discourse within a healthy contact zone, a discursive space not defined by the drawing of borders themselves (especially given the multiple positions she occupies on stage), but by the recognition of the collision of borders and boundaries that not only calls them into question, but sees them as transmutable and transportable.


If we were to go back and do this assignment over, I would push heavily to provide something similar to what Ashley, Andrew, and Stephanie did. Our approach privileged multiplicity in subject position, so it’s ironic that we offered only one map. I liked being able to see multiple representations, multiple schemes of delimitation that challenged the codified, Western narratives of definition, demarcation, and progress. Like our visualization, their approach may not have been correct, but they achieved a level of thoroughness that we did not in their extremely hybridized approach. Data can be mined and visualized in so many ways. Thus, it is important to not just present one projection of the data and, consequently, position it as the only projection of data.